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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
of Peoria v. The Nichols & Shepard Company.10 However, in that case,
the agent was a mere sales representative whereas, in the principal case,
the agents were the officers of the plaintiff. The cases are distinguishable
because officers are charged with the management of a corporation's daily
affairs and are vested with more discretion than a mere sales representative.
The analogy is further weakened because the forgers had since become
authorized signers, although that information had not yet been communi-
cated to the bank. It would appear that the defendant was correct in
returning the voucher to the officers because the only other apparent al-
ternative was to return it to the board of directors which met only inter-
mittently and which was effectively incapable of receiving it."
The statute, by imposing an absolute duty, placed an extreme limit
upon the period during which the depositor could perfect its cause of
action and thus offered the bank an opportunity to seek restitution sea-
sonably. It, in effect, provided that the account between the depositor
and the bank became an account stated no later than one year after the
return of the voucher unless the depositor gave notice within that period.
The statute enhances the equities between the parties because its effect
was to give the bank a definite advantage which it did not previously
possess. On the other hand, it works no particular hardship on the de-
positor by imposing the duty of giving notice within one year. While this
requirement is inconsistent with the common law of Illinois, the only
real obstacle to its easy fulfillment is the carelessness of the depositor in
managing its own affairs.
H. Q. ROHDE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-WHETHER THE DENIAL OF
LOYALTY CLEARANCES MAY BE BASED ON FACELESS INFORMER EVIDENCE-
Much recent controversy has centered on the problem of whether or not a
person working with classified government material can be denied a loyalty
clearance through an administrative proceeding in which he is not allowed
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The "cold war" has
tended to accentuate the issues presented, so that both sides of the con-
troversy have now been fully represented by vigorous exponents. Typically
this problem has embraced two classes of individuals who have been denied
loyalty clearances; those engaged in governmental projects who are pri-
vately employed by firms working on government contracts, and those
employed directly by the government.
10223 Il. 41, 79 N. E. 38 (1906).
11 A case from another jurisdiction supports this conclusion. The Court of Ap-
peals of New York held that when vouchers are returned to the president of the
depositor, they have been returned to the depositor within the meaning of the
New York statute: Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co. of New York, 204 N. Y. 200,
97 N. E. 517 (1912).
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The leading case reviewing this point is that of Bailey v. Richardson,'
which resulted in a four-to-four affirmance of a lower court decision by
the United States Supreme Court. Therein, it was determined that the
government could dismiss an employee in its executive branch without
disclosing the sources of the information on which it based her dismissal.
This administrative proceeding was upheld against the contention that it
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the federal con-
stitution. It was allowed to stand affirmed, principally because national
security was found to have been intimately related to the non-disclosure
of the evidence and its sources.
In analyzing all of the considerations, the reviewing courts have first
turned to the matter of jurisdiction. The petitioner must first show that
he has been denied a right to life, liberty or property before he can dem-
onstrate that he has sufficient standing to raise a question of due process
of law. At the outset, he is at a loss to show that he has been deprived of
life, and his liberty has not been curtailed in any way, so he must neces-
sarily turn to his property rights in order to spell out a standing.
It has been repeatedly held that public employment is not "property"
and that a loyalty clearance is not a contract.2 The criterion for appoint-
ment and removal of governmental employees is the confidence of their
superior officers, and confidence is not a concept which can be tested under
due process of law. Further, a loyalty clearance, itself, is a matter of
privilege, not a vested right. Even after the privilege of a loyalty clear-
ance has been granted, it still does not ripen into a property right, as do
licenses to engage in learned professions.3
Petitioners who have successfully spelled out property rights have
done so on the theory that they have acquired special training at con-
siderable expense, that they are prepared to engage only in a narrow field
of endeavor, that this field is entirely occupied by government-controlled
projects, that without a loyalty clearance they cannot be so employed, and
they would thus be forced to accept a lesser position at a loss of salary
if denied a loyalty clearance. 4 But even if a petitioner established a
property right of which he has been denied, a further jurisdictional hurdle
faces him. There is a strong line of cases that indicates that the courts
will not review actions of executive officials in the dismissal of their em-
ployees, except to insure compliance with statutory requirements. 5 It has
186 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 P. (2d) 46 (1949), affirmed in 341 U. S. 918, 71
S. Ct. 669, 95 L. Ed. 1352 (1950).
2 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 20 S. Ct. 890, 44 L. Ed. 1187 (1900).
3 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 548, 65 S. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945).
4 Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 569, 76 S. Ct. 861, 100 L. Ed. 1396 (1955).
5 Harmon v. Brucker, 137 F. Supp. 475 (1956).
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been decided, for example, that allegations that a petitioner was innocent,
that an investigation was biased, or that removal was prejudiced, were
all immaterial so long as the executive department has acted within its
statutory limitations.6 No claim on which relief can be granted is thus
stated by the petitioner.
7
It has been contended that certain cases have been decided contrary
to the doctrine of the Bailey case,8 but these decisions can be distinguished
on one of two grounds; they either involve criminal prosecutions or have
been cases where national security was not critically at stake. The case
of United States v. Reynolds9 stands for the proposition that the courts
will not tolerate faceless-informer evidence when the petitioner is faced
with a criminal charge, and the case of United States v. Jencks10 indicated
that even the confidential files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
will be opened to a person who is faced with a criminal penalty.
The second distinguishing feature is introduced in cases where national
security could not be seriously jeopardized if a full disclosure of all
evidential sources were ordered by the court. These cases have indicated
that a petitioner will be allowed to confront and cross-examine all adverse
witnesses if the government cannot demonstrate a real danger to national
security." The burden of proof is on the government to establish danger
to national security, and no such claims will be flatly accepted without
substantiation.
12
It has been contended that denial of a loyalty clearance is comparable
to conviction of a crime in the stigma it places upon a person's character.
The results have been viewed as being similar; loss of employment op-
portunity, detriment to social standing and disgrace to family reputation.
This position has been rejected by the courts, because no fine or imprison-
ment is meted out when a loyalty clearance is denied. Therefore, the rule
of United States v. Reynolds1" is inapplicable to cases of this nature in that
suspicion of disloyalty has been determined to have peculiarities which
distinguish it from a criminal conviction.
A further factor to be considered in these cases is whether or not the
sensitivity of the position of the petitioner should be weighed in estab-
6 Eberlein v. United States, 257 U. S. 82, 42 S. Ct. 12, 66 L. Ed. 140 (1921).
7 Saggau v. Young, 138 F. Supp. 142 (1956).
a86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. (2d) 46 (1949), affirmed in 341 U. S. 918, 71
S. Ct. 669, 95 L. Ed. 1352 (1950).
9345 U. S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1952).
10353 U. S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 1103 (1957).
11 Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 569, 76 S. Ct. 861, 100 L. Ed. 1396 (1955).
12 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 75 S. Ct. 790, 99 L. Ed. 1129 (1954).
13 345 U. S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1952).
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lishing the risk to national security. The theory propounded is that an
atomic physicist would be potentially more dangerous than would some
clerk in the executive branch. The cases have rejected this proposition,
for the reason that access to classified material is the critical factor,
whether the petitioner is a secretary,1 4 a merchant seaman, 15 a civil service
employee, 16 or an atomic scientist.1'7  The danger is perceived in the access
to the material and its disclosure, rather than in the understanding of its
implications.
A further facet of this problem is illustrated by the case of Parker v.
Lester,'8 wherein a merchant seaman who was privately employed was
denied a loyalty clearance. A loyalty clearance was required in his case,
because he worked with classified government material in the normal course
of his employment. When a clearance was denied, he was dismissed from
his position. He contended that the government could deal with its own
employees in this manner, as an inherent right, but that it could not do so
in the case of persons privately employed. This contention was rejected by
the court, because the danger to national security was said to be equally as
great in private employment as it was in public employment.
In support of the government's position, one designed to justify the
use of faceless-informer evidence, there is a persuasive line of cases which
tend to favor its use in loyalty-clearance cases. This type of evidence has
been upheld in immigration cases' 9 for the same reasons. The discretion
of the attorney general has been upheld where the surrounding circum-
stances have made it necessary to resort to faceless-informer evidence in
the interest of national security.
20
There are two basic considerations which have led the courts to favor
the position of the government. First, it has been demonstrated that
government agents cannot function effectively after they have been made
to appear and testify in open judicial proceedings. After that, they can
be identified and avoided by others under suspicion. Secondly, it has
been argued that cross-examination and the full disclosure of all evidence
would in itself, damage national security. The confidential material sought
to be protected by loyalty-clearance proceedings might thus be prejudi-
cially revealed.
14 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. (2d) 46 (1949) ; affirmed in 341 U. S. 918, 71 S.
Ct. 669, 95 L. Ed. 1352 (1952).
15 Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (1953).
16 Scher v. Weeks, 231 F. (2d) 494 (1956).
17 Nadelhaft v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 930 (1955).
18112 F. Supp. 433 (1953).
19 Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 76 S. Ct. 919, 100 L. Ed. 1242 (1956).
20 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309,
94 L. Ed. 317 (1950).
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It is submitted, however, that there is another side to the policy lying
behind this problem that must be considered. If the government seeks to
protect national security, it must procure the finest personnel available,
to further the advancement of atomic research. Such prospective personnel
certainly would not be encouraged to engage in activities which require
loyalty clearances, if those clearances could be revoked on a basis of
faceless-informer evidence. The possible hardship involved may discourage
many who might otherwise be willing to make a career of public employ-
ment.
Opposed to the position of the government is the case of the individual
who stands under suspicion of disloyalty. The harm to him is substantial;
he may lose his employment, his social status may suffer, he may suffer
financially, and his family may be subjected to hatred and ridicule. With
such serious consequences involved, the government should not be per-
mitted to make unfounded charges, shielded by considerations of national
security.2 There is always a danger that a faceless-informer will come
forth, prompted by spite or malice, secure in the knowledge that his real
motives cannot be revealed by confrontation or cross-examination on the
witness stand.
22
There is a conflict of interests, thus presented, which places national
security on one side and the right of the individual on the other. The
benefit to the country as a whole must be balanced against the possible
hardship on the individual under suspicion of disloyalty. A nation can-
not allow full freedom and immunity to those who are reasonably sus-
pected of engaging in subversive activities against it, or its destruction
from within might certainly follow. 23  When and if a real danger to
national security is demonstrated, the rights of the individual must give
way, even to the point of hardship.
24
D. J. NOVOTNY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS-
WHETHER, AFTER ACQUITTAL OR RELEASE WITHOUT CONVICTION, RETENTION
OF IDENTIFICATION DATA IN THE FILES OF A LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT
CONSTITUTES AN INVASION OF AN INDIVrDUAL'S RIGHT OF PRlvACY-Until
the decision in the case of Kolb v. O'Connor,' Illinois Appellate Courts
21 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624,
95 L. Ed. 817 (1951).
22 See the dissenting opinion of Edgerton, C. J., in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S.
App. D. C. 248, at p. 268, 182 F. (2d) 46, at p. 67 (1949).
23 Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 471 (1919).
24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).
1 14 I1. App. (2d) g1, 142 N. E. (2d) 818 (1957).
